According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the general meeting of the target company. The incumbent board can, nonetheless, search for a competing bid, a so-called “white knight”. The rationale underpinning this exception is that competing bids always benefit target’s shareholders. In this paper I will tackle this rationale, arguing that even competing bids could generate a pressure to tender on target’s shareholders and, therefore, in this case should not be considered as a benefit for them
In April 21, 2004, after 20-year-long negotiations and debates, the Council of the European Union p...
An array of defence strategies is available to help companies defend themselves against unwelcome ta...
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. ...
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the gener...
According to the EC Directive on takeovers regulation, defensive measures should be authorised by th...
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the gener...
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights inv...
Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles ...
Global Merger and Acquisition activity reached record levels in 2006, with the US and EU playing a l...
Responding to my comments in the Stanford Law Review, and to those of Lucian Bebchuk in the Harvard ...
This dissertation investigates the manager motivations involved in the participation of White Knight...
This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutra...
The chapter argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutr...
This paper contains the European Company Law Experts\u27 response to the report of the European Comm...
Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target Abstract Initially uninformed ...
In April 21, 2004, after 20-year-long negotiations and debates, the Council of the European Union p...
An array of defence strategies is available to help companies defend themselves against unwelcome ta...
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. ...
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the gener...
According to the EC Directive on takeovers regulation, defensive measures should be authorised by th...
According to the EC Directive on Takeover Bids, defensive measures should be authorised by the gener...
We analyze the dynamics of takeover contests where hostile raiders compete against white knights inv...
Better answers often await better questions. In the wake of a recent series of provocative articles ...
Global Merger and Acquisition activity reached record levels in 2006, with the US and EU playing a l...
Responding to my comments in the Stanford Law Review, and to those of Lucian Bebchuk in the Harvard ...
This dissertation investigates the manager motivations involved in the participation of White Knight...
This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutra...
The chapter argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutr...
This paper contains the European Company Law Experts\u27 response to the report of the European Comm...
Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a Takeover Target Abstract Initially uninformed ...
In April 21, 2004, after 20-year-long negotiations and debates, the Council of the European Union p...
An array of defence strategies is available to help companies defend themselves against unwelcome ta...
Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. ...